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Abstract
An illusory correlation (IC) is the erroneous perception that two actually uncorrelated categories are correlated. The Shared
Distinctiveness Approach (SDA) explains ICs with heightened accessibility of distinctive category combinations in episodic
memory. However, empirical evidence for this approach is heterogeneous. In the present event-related potential (ERP) study, we
exploited the fact that more distinctive items elicit larger P300 responses than less distinctive items, which potentially predict
subsequent memory performance differences for such items. Distinctiveness at encoding was created by presenting words that
differed from frequently presented, positive words in valence, font color, or both. We hypothesized that shared distinctiveness
(deviation in both color and valence) would lead to an enhanced P300 subsequent memory effect (SME), better source memory
performance, and an overestimation of the frequency of shared distinctive items. Behavioral results indicated the presence of
shared distinctiveness effects on source memory and frequency estimation. Unexpectedly, memory also was enhanced for
positive items in the frequent color. This pattern also was reflected in the P300 for highly positive and negative items.
However, shared distinctiveness did not modulate the P300 SME, indicating that the processing of distinctive features might
only indirectly contribute to better encoding. This study shows that shared distinctiveness indeed is associated with better source
memory and ICs. Because effects were observed for the most frequent and the least frequent category combination, our results
imply that the processing of distinctiveness might involve attention allocation to diametrical category combinations, thereby
accentuating the differences between the categories.
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Introduction
Memory for extraordinary events often is superior to memory
for ordinary events (Schmidt, 1991, 2012; von Restorff,
1933). This is not only true for dramatic events, such as 09/
11, but also for more mundane ones—an unusual face, a psy-
chologist among lawyers, or the first kiss (Hunt, 2006;
Schmidt, 2012). According to Schmidt (2012), distinctiveness
can arise from at least four different sources: 1) deviance from
the immediate surrounding context (“primary distinctive-
ness”); 2) bizarreness or infrequency in lifetime experience
(“secondary distinctiveness”); 3) emotionally engaging and
arousing stimuli (“emotional significance”); or 4) relevant,
nonarousing (“high-priority”) stimuli. All four sources have
been shown to make an event more memorable (see Schmidt,
1991, for a review). Furthermore, stimuli or events become
even more memorable, if they are distinctive on two or more
features (Hunt & Mitchell, 1982; Kuhbandner & Pekrun,
2013; Weigl, Mecklinger, & Rosburg, 2016b). The presence
of two or more distinctive features is known as shared distinc-
tiveness or paired distinctiveness in the literature (Hamilton &
Gifford, 1976; Johnson & Mullen, 1994; McArthur &
Friedman, 1980).
However, distinctiveness not only affects memory, but also
influences primarily memory-based frequency judgments
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(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Tversky and Kahneman
(1973) proposed that availability (i.e., the ease of retrieval)
of memories at the time of judgment is used to gauge the
frequency of occurrence of an event in simple frequency judg-
ments or the frequency of co-occurrence of two events in
covariation judgments. Because distinctive memories are
highly available, these memories affect frequency and covari-
ation judgments (Rothbart, Fulero, Jensen, Howard, & Birrell,
1978; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Distinctiveness plays a
particular important role in so-called illusory correlations
(ICs), i.e., the subjective judgment of the covariation of two
events that are actually uncorrelated (Chapman, 1967;
Hamilton & Gifford, 1976).
In the first study on the IC, Chapman (1967) presented
participants a series of word pairs, which contained many
short words and only few long words and found that partic-
ipants systematically overestimated the joint occurrence of
long words. This result has been replicated in subsequent
studies (Chadwick & Taylor, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman,
1973). Hamilton and Gifford (1976) extended these findings
to the social domain. In their seminal study, participants read
descriptions of persons who belonged either to the majority
(Group A) or the minority (Group B) and showed either
desirable or undesirable behavior. The majority was twice
as large as the minority and desirable behavior was twice
as frequent as undesirable behavior. Despite the zero corre-
lation between group membership and desirability, the par-
ticipants not only overestimated the co-occurrence of minor-
ity members and undesirable behavior, but also evaluated the
minority less favorable than the majority indicating the ac-
quisition of a group stereotype. Furthermore, the participants
more accurately recalled the group membership for negative
items of the minority.
Several theoretical accounts have been proposed to explain
ICs, such as the memory trace model (Smith, 1991), the infor-
mation loss account (Fiedler, 1991), or recurrent connectionist
models (Van Rooy et al., 2003). The Shared Distinctiveness
Account (SDA; Hamilton, Dugan, & Trolier, 1985; Hamilton
& Gifford, 1976) is of particular importance for the present
study, because we are interested in the neural underpinnings of
shared distinctiveness in the IC paradigm. The Accentuation
Account (McGarty et al., 1993) and the Attention Theory (AT;
Sherman et al., 2009), which combines the SDA and the
Accentuation Account into a unifying framework, are more rel-
evant for the interpretation of our results than for the outline of
the study or the formulation of our hypotheses. As a conse-
quence, these accounts will be described in the discussion.
The SDA (Hamilton et al., 1985; Hamilton & Gifford,
1976) explains ICs with heightened accessibility of infre-
quent, distinctive category combinations in episodic memo-
ry. More precisely, the shared distinctiveness of category
combinations with two infrequent attributes is supposed to
lead to better encoding (relative to the more common
category combinations), also increasing the availability of
such distinctive category combinations at retrieval.
Frequency judgments are not only determined by the actual
frequency of occurrence, but also by the availability
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Therefore, an increased avail-
ability of rare category combinations in memory might lead
to an overestimation of their frequency and, consequently, to
ICs (Hamilton, 1981; Hamilton et al., 1985; Hamilton &
Gifford, 1976). Indeed, studies using cued recall (see
Mullen & Johnson, 1990, for a review), free recall
(Hamilton et al., 1985), or one-shot ICs (Risen et al., 2007)
support the heightened memory hypothesis of the SDA.
However, other studies relying on signal detection theory
(Fiedler et al., 1993) or multinomial processing tree models
(Bulli & Primi, 2006; Klauer & Meiser, 2000) failed to ac-
crue evidence for the SDA. To sum up, the empirical evi-
dence for the SDA from behavioral experiments has so far
been ambiguous.
In a previous behavioral study (Weigl, Mecklinger, et al.,
2016b), we used group-behavior descriptions similar to
Hamilton and Gifford (1976) and optimized their original de-
sign for memory tests. More precisely, the frequency of items
from themajority, minority, and novel distractors in the source
memory task were equated and only items from intermediate
list positions were tested. This optimized paradigm not only
took primacy and recency effects into account but also elim-
inated the confound between discrimination and response bias
that usually arises from the skewed frequency distributions in
the IC paradigm. The average source memory accuracy was
equal for descriptions of the majority and minority. However,
memory for negative behavior of the minority was elevated
compared with positive behavior of the minority, even after
controlling for response bias. Furthermore, source memory
predicted the extent of IC.
The main goal of the present study was to reexamine the
effect of shared distinctiveness on memory in the IC paradigm
by using event-related potentials (ERPs). Because ERPs can
be recorded online during the encoding of stimuli, ERPs can
provide more direct evidence for the propositions of the SDA
than behavioral measures. The P300 (also labeled P3) is an
endogenous ERP component with a posterior maximum and
peaks around 500 or 600 ms, when words are used as stimuli
(Fabiani & Donchin, 1995; Kutas, McCarthy, & Donchin,
1977; Weigl, Ehritt, Mecklinger, & Rosburg, 2016a). The
P300 is presumed to index attention allocation and has been
related to the subjective probability of events (Polich, 2007).
The effect of distinctiveness on encoding processes was
often investigated by the analysis of subsequent memory
effects (SME; see Cohen et al., 2015; Fabiani, 2006;
Friedman & Johnson, 2000, for reviews). For such an anal-
ysis, ERP data of items at encoding are retrospectively sorted
depending on whether items were remembered or forgotten
at testing. The analysis of SMEs can provide insights in the
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neural foundation of cognitive processes responsible for suc-
cessful encoding (Cohen et al., 2015; Friedman & Johnson,
2000; Paller & Wagner, 2002). There is ample evidence that
the P300 at encoding is related to subsequent memory per-
formance (Fabiani & Donchin, 1995; Fabiani, Karis, &
Donchin, 1990; Kamp, Bader, & Mecklinger, 2017; Karis,
Fabiani, & Donchin, 1984; Neville, Kutas, Chesney, &
Schmidt, 1986; Weigl, Ehritt, et al., 2016a; see Fabiani,
2006, for a review). The P300 reflects the encoding of
item-specific information (Fabiani et al., 1990; Kamp et al.,
2017) and the P300 SME seems to be related to subsequent
recollection-based recognition, i.e., the retrieval of contextual
details (Mangels et al., 2001; Weigl, Ehritt, et al., 2016a).
Because distinctive events typically elicit a P300 and the
P300 amplitude predicts subsequent memory, the P300
seems ideally suited for investigating shared distinctiveness
in the IC paradigm.
In the present ERP study, we investigated the effects of
shared distinctiveness on the P300 at encoding and on source
memory by using the methodologically optimized IC para-
digm, introduced in Weigl, Mecklinger, et al. (2016b). We
created distinctiveness at encoding by presenting words that
differed from frequently presented, positive words in valence
or font color. Deviations in both—valence and font color—
were considered as shared distinctiveness. As in the vast ma-
jority of IC studies (Mullen & Johnson, 1990), we chose pos-
itive items as frequent valence type. Even though studies with
negative items as frequent valence type also reported ICs, the
effect sizes were substantially smaller than in studies with
positive items as frequent valence type (Mullen & Johnson,
1990).We hypothesized that shared distinctiveness leads to an
enhanced P300 SME, better source memory, and an IC.
Methods
Participants
Forty healthy, right-handed students of the Saarland
University (31 females; median age: 22.5 years; range: 19-
30 years) participated in this study for partial course credit.
The sample size for the current experiment was a-priori deter-
mined based on the effect sizes reported in the meta-analysis
by Mullen and Johnson (1990) and our prior studies on the IC
and ERP SMEs (Weigl et al., 2018;Weigl, Ehritt et al., 2016a;
Weigl, Mecklinger, et al., 2016b). All participants were
German native speakers and had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. Four additional participants had to be excluded
due to lack of compliance (three participants reported napping
during the experiment, and one participant took a break during
an experimental task). All participants gave written, informed
consent prior to participation.
Materials
A total of 320 positive and 160 negative German nouns
were selected from Lahl, Göritz, Pietrowsky, and
Rosenberg (2009). Word frequency information was taken
from the database dlexDB (Heister et al., 2011). Positive
and negative words were matched for arousal, concrete-
ness, word length, and word frequency. However, items
could not be matched for intensity (or extremity; i.e., the
valence ratings that were converted to a common scale), a
factor known to affect memory for emotional words
(Kamp et al., 2015). Thus, positive items were more pos-
itive than negative items were negative. The descriptive
statistics for the material can be found in Table S1.
There were ten study-test cycles; 240 positive and 120
negative words were divided into ten study lists of 36 words.
Each list contained 16 positive and 8 negative words present-
ed in the majority source color and 8 positive and 4 negative
words presented in the minority source color (Table 1). Purple
and orange were used as font (source) colors, because prior
ratings had indicated that purple and orange have the least
affective or semantic connotations. For half of the participants,
words in purple were the majority source and words in orange
were the minority source. For the other half, the colors were
reversed. The three initial words and the three words at the end
of each study list (i.e., 4 positive and 2 negative words from
the majority source) were items in the majority color and not
used as test items in order to prevent primacy and recency
effects (Weigl, Mecklinger, et al., 2016b).
For the test phases, 10 lists of 36 words were presented;
each list contained 24 positive and 12 negative words. For the
24 positive words, 8 words each were from the majority
source color, minority source color, or new. For the 12 nega-
tive words, 4 words each were from the majority source color,
the minority source color, or new (Table 1).
Procedure
The experiment consisted of ten study-test cycles (Fig. 1).
Each cycle began with a study phase, followed by a distracter
Table 1 Distribution of positive and negative words in each study-test
cycle
Study phase Test phase
Positive Negative Positive Negative
Majority 16 8 8 4
Minority 8 4 8 4
New - - 8 4
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2-back task, and the test phase. At the end of the experiment,
participants filled out a post-experimental questionnaire.
Study phase Each study phase trial had the following structure
(Fig. 2 left): The trial began with a fixation cross presented for
500 ms. Next a word was presented either in purple (R: 128,
G: 0, B: 128) or orange (R: 255, G: 165, B: 0) for 500 ms,
followed by a 1,000-ms–long blank screen. Participants were
instructed to remember the word and its color for a subsequent
memory test. Next, participants had to make a judgment of
learning (JOL; Dunlosky, Hunt, & Clark, 2000; Geraci &
Manzano, 2010; Nelson & Narens, 1990), i.e., to rate how
likely they would remember the word and its color on a scale
from 1 (“definitely will not remember”) to 6 (“definitely will
remember”). More information on the JOLs can be found in
the Supplement S4. The next trial began after the response.
2-back task The 2-back task blocks had 32 trials each. Each
block took roughly 1 minute to complete. Each trial had the
following structure: a number between one and four was pre-
sented for 500 ms followed by a fixation cross for 1,500 ms.
Participants were required to press the space bar, whenever the
presented number matched the number presented two trials
before. The 2-back taskwas introduced to prevent effects from
immediate perceptual repetition and rehearsal (Grillon,
Johnson, Krebs, & Huron, 2008).
Test phase Each test phase trial had the following structure
(Fig. 2 right): The trial began with a 1,000-ms–long blank
screen, followed by a fixation cross presented for 500 ms.
Next, a test cue was presented in white color, which was
either a new word or a word from the study phase. The
frequencies of majority, minority, and new items were
equated at test, thereby reducing response bias (Weigl,
Mecklinger, et al., 2016b) (Table 1). The participants had
to make an old/new judgment on a six-point scale ranging
from “surely new” to “surely old.” If the participants iden-
tified a word as “old,” they then had to make a judgment on
the source (majority color or minority color) on a six-point
scale ranging from “surely purple” to “surely orange.”
There was no time limit for the old/new and source judg-










1 min.ca.2.5 min. ca.3 min.
Fig. 1 The procedure of the whole experimental session. The questionnaire with the frequency estimation task was handed to the
participants only after they completed all 10 study-test cycles
Fig. 2 Procedure of the study phase (left) and test phase (right). Please note that the language actually used in our study was German
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Post-experimental questionnaire In the post-experimental
questionnaire, participants estimated the relative frequency
of negative items for each source (font color) in the whole
experiment in addition to several control questions about the
experiment. It is common in IC research only to ask the fre-
quency of negative items (Hamilton & Gifford, 1976; Weigl
et al., 2018), because the frequency of positive items can be
inferred from the participants’ responses (i.e., estimate for
positive words = 1 – estimate for negative words).
Frequency estimates were also separately assessed for the last
block (see Supplement S5 for more information).
EEG recording and preprocessing
An elastic cap (Easycap, Herrsching, Germany) with 58 em-
bedded Ag/AgCl EEG electrodes was attached to the partici-
pant’s head. EEG was continuously recorded from Fp1, Fpz,
Fp2, AF3, AF4, F7, F5, F3, F1, Fz, F2, F4, F6, F8, FT7, FC5,
FC3, FC1, FCz, FC2, FC4, FC6, FT8, T7, C5, C3, C1, Cz,
C2, C4, C6, T8, TP7, CP5, CP3, CP1, CPz, CP2, CP4, CP6,
TP8, P7, P5, P3, P1, Pz, P2, P4, P6, P8, PO7, PO3, POz, PO4,
PO8, O1, Oz, O2, as well as from the right mastoid (M2). We
used the left mastoid (M1) as online reference and AFz as
ground electrode. Electro-oculographic activity was recorded
with two electrodes placed on the outer canthi and by a pair of
electrodes placed above and below the right eye. Electrode
impedances were kept below 5 kΩ. Data were sampled at
500 Hz and filtered online from 0.016 to 250 Hz. Only data
of the study phase is reported here.
Offline, EEG data were processed with the Brain Vision
Analyzer 2.0.3 (Brain Products, Gilching, Germany). Data
were down-sampled to 200 Hz and a high-pass filter at
0.1 Hz was applied. Cardiovascular, muscle, and ocular arti-
facts were removed via independent component analysis
(ICA). Next, data were re-referenced to linked mastoids and
a low-pass filter at 30 Hz (48 dB/oct) was applied. Then, data
were segmented into epochs of 2,200 ms (including 200 ms
prestimulus baseline) and baseline correction was performed.
Data were screened for remaining artifacts and all segments
containing amplitudes outside the range of −100 to 100 μV or
voltage steps exceeding 50 μV/ms were removed.
Data analysis
For the analysis of source memory performance, we treated
the three points “surely new,” “quite surely new,” and “maybe
new” of the confidence rating as new response and the three
points “surely old,” “quite surely old,” and “maybe old” as old
response. A similar procedure was used for the source judg-
ments (purple vs. orange). Thus, a correct majority source
response was defined as an item that received an old response
and was assigned to the majority source. Likewise, a correct
minority source response was defined as an item that received
an old response and was assigned to the minority source.
Source memory performance was quantified by calculating
the unbiased hit rates for correct source judgments (Wagner,
1993) for each source (majority, minority, new) and valence
(positive, negative). Unbiased hit rates take into account both
stimulus frequency and response frequency and have been
used in other source memory studies (Bell et al., 2012;
Suzuki & Suga, 2010; Weigl, Mecklinger, & Rosburg,
2018; see Supplement S2 for the calculation of unbiased hit
rates). Unbiased hit rates are calculated by multiplying the
conditional probability of correctly classifying an item as a
majority, minority, or new item (i.e., p(correct response|item))
with the conditional probability of correctly applying a re-
sponse category (“majority,” “minority,” or “new”) given that
it is applied (i.e., p(correct response|response); see
Supplement S2 for more information). The resulting values
can range from 0 to 1 and thus can be interpreted like normal
hit rates. The resulting values were then arcsine transformed
for statistical analysis (Wagner, 1993). A Source (majority vs.
minority vs. new) x Valence (positive vs. negative) repeated-
measure ANOVA was calculated for the unbiased hit rates. In
order to provide a more comprehensive picture of the memory
performance, we also analyzed the confidence ratings in the
source judgment for old items and the reaction times for cor-
rectly identified items. The confidence ratings for the source
judgments were subjected to a Source (majority vs. minority)
x Valence (positive vs. negative) repeated-measure ANOVA.
The reaction times to the old/new judgment were subjected to
a Source (majority vs. minority vs. new) x Valence (positive
vs. negative) repeated-measure ANOVA.
In order to assess the extent of IC, we compared the esti-
mated frequency of negative words for the majority and the
minority source across the whole experiment using dependent
t-tests. In addition, we used the frequency estimates to calcu-
late the phi coefficient as a direct measure of the extent of IC.
Fisher’s Z transformed phi coefficients were analyzed using a
single-sample t-test.
Consistent with recommendations on best practice (Luck&
Gaspelin, 2017), we restricted the ERP analysis of the P300 in
the study phase to the a priori defined time window from 500
to 700ms and the a priori selected electrode Pz. The suitability
of these a priori restrictions is corroborated by the literature on
the P300 SME (see Fabiani, 2006 for a review) and a prior
subsequent memory study (Weigl, Ehritt, et al., 2016a). P300
SME contrasted subsequently remembered study items (i.e.,
items correctly judged as “old”) with subsequently forgotten
study items (i.e., items falsely judged as “new”). Due to the
imbalanced design resulting from the skewed frequency dis-
tribution of the IC paradigm (Hamilton & Gifford, 1976) and
from the dependence of trial numbers on subsequent memory
performance (i.e., high memory performance led to fewer
forgotten trials and vice versa; see Table S3 for the trial
numbers; Tibon & Levy, 2015), we decided to analyze the
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P300 on the single trial level with multilevel linear modeling
(MLM; see Finch, Bolin, & Kelley, 2014, for a general
introduction). MLM is an alternative to the repeated-measure
ANOVA and is especially useful for unbalanced designs as in
our case (Field et al., 2012). The main advantage of MLM
over the repeated-measure ANOVA is that there is no need
to exclude participants due to low trial numbers in specific
experimental conditions and the analysis can be based on the
whole sample (Tibon & Levy, 2015).
All data except the single-trial EEG analysis were analyzed
using SPSS 24. Significance level was set to p = 0.05 for all
analyses. For all repeated-measure ANOVAs, the sphericity
assumption was tested with Mauchly’s test and the
Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied when necessary.
For the MLM, we used R 3.4.1 and the package nlme 3.1-131
(Pinheiro et al., 2018).
Results
Behavioral results
Source memory The analysis of the unbiased hit rates for
correct source judgments (see Fig. 3, top) revealed a signifi-
cant main effect for source (F(2, 78) = 149.67, p < 0.001, ηp
2 =
0.79), but no main effect for valence (F(1, 39) = 0.22, p =
0.642, ηp
2 = 0.01). Unbiased hit rates were higher for new
items than for old items (F(1, 39) = 257.06, p < 0.001, ηp
2 =
0.87). There was no difference between the majority source
and the minority source (F(1, 39) = 0.88, p = 0.354, ηp
2 =
0.02). Furthermore, there was an interaction between source
and valence (F(1.69, 65.78) = 4.29, p = 0.023, ηp
2 = 0.10).
The follow-up interaction contrasts for the old items was sig-
nificant (F(1, 39) = 4.11, p = 0.050, ηp
2 = 0.10). The unbiased
hit rates were higher in the majority than in the minority for
positive items, but lower in the majority than in the minority
for negative items. Follow-up t-tests did, however, not reveal
any significant differences between positive and negative
items for the majority source (t(39) = 1.55, p = 0.065, one-
sided, Cohen’s d = 0.24) or minority source (t(39) = −1.25, p =
0.109, one-sided, Cohen’s d = −0.20).
The analysis of the confidence ratings for the source judg-
ments (see Fig. 3, middle) revealed a main effect for source
(F(1, 39) = 5.21, p = 0.028, ηp
2 = 0.12) and a trend for valence
(F(1, 39) = 3.12, p = 0.085, ηp
2 = 0.07). There also was a
significant interaction between source and valence (F(1, 39)
= 10.05, p = 0.003, ηp
2 = 0.21). One-sided t-tests revealed that
the participants were more confident in their source judgments
to positive majority items than to negative majority items
(t(39) = 3.70, p < 0.001, one-sided, Cohen’s d = 0.59), and
participants were more confident in their source judgment to
negative minority items than to positive minority items (t(39)
= −1.99, p = 0.027, one-sided, Cohen’s d = −0.32).
The analysis of reaction times to items attributed to the
correct source (see Fig. 3, bottom) revealed a main effect for
source (F(1, 39) = 10.80, p < 0.001, ε = 0.79, ηp
2 = 0.22), but
not for valence (F(1, 39) = 2.27, p = 0.140, ηp
2 = 0.06).
Reaction times were faster for new items than for old items
(F(1, 39) = 14.07, p = 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.27). No differences
emerged between majority source and minority source (F(1,
39) = 0.77, p = 0.387, ηp
2 = 0.02). Critically, the interaction
between source and valence was significant (F(2, 78) = 5.01, p
= 0.009, ηp
2 = 0.11). Participants reacted faster to negative
majority items and positive minority items than to positive
majority items or negative minority items (F(1, 39) = 6.62, p
= 0.014, ηp
2 = 0.15).
To sum up, a consistent pattern was observed for all three
dependent variables—unbiased hit rates, source confidence



















































Fig. 3 Overview over the behavioral results from the test phase. Top:
Source memory performance as measured by unbiased hit rates.
Middle: Source confidence ratings. Bottom: Reaction times. The error
bars represent within-subject 95% confidence intervals for the source x
valence interaction. Please note that the colors used for illustrating the
majority/minority are exemplary: Color attribution for majority and mi-
nority words was balanced across participants
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For the majority color, participants made more accurate and
more confident, but slower memory judgments for positive
items than for negative items. For the minority items, the
reverse pattern was observed.
Frequency judgment Across all blocks, the frequency of neg-
ative words in the minority source was overestimated relative
to the frequency of negative words in the majority source
(majority: M = 0.39, SD = 0.15; minority: M = 0.46, SD =
0.16; t(39) = −2.02, p = 0.025, one-sided, Cohen’s d = 0.32),
indicating the presence of an IC. Furthermore, the participants
correctly rated the majority source as highly frequent (M =
0.61, SD = 0.15; t(39) = 4.72; p < 0.001, one-sided, Cohen’s d
= 0.75). However, their estimates were lower than the actual
frequency (0.67).We also calculated a phi coefficient from the
frequency ratings and found a significant IC (M = 0.07, SD =
0.21; t(39) = 2.00, p = 0.026, one-sided, Cohen’s d = 0.36).
Next, we ran separate multiple regressions for the unbiased
hit rates and the confidence ratings to assess whether memory
performance predicts the IC as proposed by the SDA. To our
surprise, neither regression model was significant (unbiased
hit rates: R2 = 0.13, F(4, 35) = 1.26, p = 0.303; confidence
ratings: R2 = 0.09, F(4, 35) = 0.82, p = 0.521). However, the
results from the regression analysis need to be treated with
some caution due to violations in the assumption of homosce-
dasticity and of normality of the residuals.
ERP results: P300 subsequentmemory effect (500-700
ms)
Model selection
The P300 SME was analyzed with MLM at Pz for the time
window from 500 to 700 ms. The need for a MLM was
assessed with an intercept test (Field et al., 2012). For this
purpose, we included participants as a random intercept (see
Table 2 for information on model fit). A comparison of the
random intercept model with the intercept only model re-
vealed that the P300 amplitude at Pz varied across participants
(χ2(1) = 541.39, p < 0.001; ICC = 0.07). Next, we included
study block as another random intercept nested in the partic-
ipants. Again, the P300 differed across study blocks (χ2(1) =
25.17, p < 0.001; ICC = 0.07 for participants, ICC = 0.02 for
the blocks nested within participants). We defined this three-
level model as our baseline model.1
In the first analysis, we added the grand-mean centered
factors Valence (Negative: −0.67, Positive: 0.33), Source
(Minority: −0.50, Majority: 0.50), and Memory (Forgotten:
−0.81, Remember: 0.19) and the grand-mean centered vari-
able Intensity as well as all interactions between these vari-
ables as fixed effects to the baseline model. Intensity was
included as a covariate, because the positive and negative
items differed in intensity (see Section 2.2). The inclusion of
these variables significantly improved the model fit (χ2(15) =
35.34, p = 0.002). Because inclusion of random slopes for
Memory did not improve model fit (χ2(4) = 1.57, p =
0.813), we decided to use the random intercept model for
interpretation.
Model interpretation
Information on the coefficients of the final model can be
found in Table 3. The analysis revealed a significant effect
for Memory indicating that the P300 was larger for subse-
quently remembered items compared with subsequently
forgotten items (Figures S1 and S5) and a significant effect
for Source indicating that the P300 was larger for the rare
color than for the common color (Figures S2 and S5).
There was, however, no effect for Valence (Figure S3).
In contrast to our hypothesis, we failed to obtain a signif-
icant interaction between Valence and Source or between
Valence, Source, and Memory. However, there were mar-
ginally significant interactions between Valence, Source,
and Intensity (Figure 4) and between Intensity and
Memory (see Figs. 4 and S4).
In order to follow-up these interactions, we used the
terciles for Intensity to divide the data set into three sub-
sets, a low, a medium and a high intensity subset (see Fig.
4 for the ERP waveforms). For the high intensity subset,
the follow-up analyses revealed a significant interaction
between Valence and Source (b = 2.15, t(2673) = 2.61, p
= 0.009; Fig. 5). The P300 was larger for positive items
than for negative items of the majority color (b = 1.15,
t(1137) = 2.02, p = 0.044). For the minority color, a trend
in the reverse direction was found, i.e., the P300




Intercept only 70159.63 70173.93 -35077.81
Random intercept for participants 69620.24 69641.70 -34807.12




Model 1 69591.74 69727.65 -34776.87
Model 2 69598.17 69762.69 -34776.08
1 Some might argue that study block should be treated as a level 1 variable
rather than as a level 2 variable. Therefore, we conducted an additional mul-
tilevel analysis with study block as Helmert contrast coded level 1 variable.
This model rendered virtually identical results as our three-level model. One
noteworthy result from this analysis was that the P300 was lower in the first
block relative to all other blocks. For the sake of clarity, we decided to use the
three-level model for interpretation.
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amplitudes tended to be larger for negative items than for
positive items (b = −1.00, t(1138) = −1.67, p = 0.096).
Furthermore, the P300 was significantly larger for negative
items in the minority color than for negative items in the
majority color (b = −2.47, t(366) = −3.26, p = 0.001). For
positive items, however, no such difference between the
majority and minority color was observed (b = −0.19,
t(1990) = −0.49, p = 0.627). Furthermore, there also was
a significant effect for Memory in the high intensity subset
(b = 1.46, t(2675) = 3.19, p = 0.002).
The interaction between Valence and Source was not sig-
nificant for the low and medium intensity subset (b = −0.54,
t(2698) = −0.78, p = 0.434 and b = −1.06, t(2865) = −1.31, p =
0.189, respectively) or when collapsing across low and medi-
um intensity items (b = −0.41, t(5966) = −0.84, p = 0.403).
Furthermore, the effect for Memory was on a trend level for
the low intensity subset (b = 0.78, t(2700) = 1.71, p = 0.087)
and absent in the medium intensity subset (b = 0.75, t(2867) =
1.64, p = 0.100). However, the effect for Memory became
significant when collapsing across low and medium intensity
items (b = 0.76, t(5968) = 2.34, p = 0.019), suggesting that the
SMEwas weaker for low and medium intensity items than for
high intensity items.
To sum up, the ERP data revealed that the P300 amplitude
predicted subsequent memory. The SME was most pro-
nounced for high intensity stimuli. Furthermore, only for
highly intense stimuli, shared distinctiveness affected the
P300 amplitude: The P300 amplitude was larger for positive
majority and negative minority stimuli than for negative ma-
jority and positive minority stimuli.
Discussion
Most neurophysiological studies on social cognition focus on
preexisting stereotypes or on person perception (Bartholow,
Fabiani, Gratton, & Bettencourt, 2001) and studies on inter-
group attitude formation are scant (Spiers et al., 2016). Our
ERP study went a step further and distilled the core features of
the IC paradigm to provide a more integrative perspective of
the contribution of ICs to stereotype acquisition. To the best of
our knowledge, our study is the first to investigate shared
distinctiveness and ICs with ERPs.
We investigated the effect of shared distinctiveness on
source memory and its neural correlates with an optimized
IC paradigm introduced by Weigl, Mecklinger, et al.
(2016b). Shared distinctiveness at encoding was created by
presenting (frequent) positive and (infrequent) negative
words, either in a frequent or infrequent color. Based on the
SDA, we had hypothesized that shared distinctiveness leads to
1) better sourcememory for the minority than the majority and
best source memory performance for negative minority items,
and 2) enhanced P300 SME for the minority than the majority
and the largest P300 SMEs for negative minority items, as
discussed in the following.
Effects of shared distinctiveness on memory
The prediction of the SDA for the behavioral source memory
data were only partially fulfilled. Whereas source memory
was indeed better for negative minority items than for positive
minority items, positive majority items were better remem-
bered than negative majority items. Moreover, overall source
memory performance was actually similar for the majority and
minority, contrary to the assumptions of the SDA. These be-
havioral findings are largely in line with some of our previous
findings (Weigl, Mecklinger, et al., 2016b). The findings do
not corroborate the SDA, as the shared distinctive items were
not remembered best. However, in the current study, we were
able to provide evidence for better memory for negative rela-
tive to positive items within the minority, when primacy and
recency effects were considered and when the frequencies of
majority items, minority items, and novel distractors items
were equated in the source memory task. Prior IC studies,
which did not consider these methodological aspects, found
superior memory for the majority (Fiedler et al., 1993; Weigl
et al., 2018) or for negative items (Klauer & Meiser, 2000),
Table 3 Information on model fit for the hierarchical linear model
analyses
B SE B t(9030)
(Intercept) 3.05 0.42 7.21 (p < .001)
Valence 0.03 0.23 0.15 (p =.880)
Source -0.76 0.21 -3.59 (p < .001)
Intensity 0.15 0.11 1.34 (p = .179)
Memory 0.96 0.28 3.41 (p < .001)
Valence x Source 0.27 0.46 0.60 (p = .547)
Valence x Intensity -0.03 0.21 -0.13 (p = .897)
Source x Intensity 0.22 0.23 0.96 (p = .336)
Valence x Memory -0.30 0.58 -0.51 (p = .610)
Source x Memory -0.05 0.54 -0.09 (p = .927)
Intensity x Memory 0.58 0.29 1.96 (p = .051)
Valence x Source x Intensity 0.81 0.43 1.88 (p = .060)
Valence x Source x Memory -0.48 1.16 -0.41 (p = .682)
Valence x Intensity x Memory 0.05 0.55 0.08 (p = .934)
Source x Intensity x Memory 0.21 0.59 0.39 (p = .700)
Valence x Source x Intensity x Memory 0.91 1.10 0.82 (p = .412)
Fig. 4 P300 at the electrode Pz in the study phase for positive and
negative items of high, medium or low intensity. Dashed lines denote
forgotten items and solid lines denote remembered items. The grey bar
indicates the 500-700 ms time window which was used for statistical
analysis. Please note that the colors used for illustrating the majority/
minority are exemplary: Color attribution for majority and minority
words was balanced
b
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but not superior memory for negative items within the minor-
ity. Of note, previous research has shown that a strong mem-
ory advantage for negative minority items relative to all other
conditions is more likely to be obtained, when the source
memory task is replaced by free recall (Hamilton et al., 1985).
Prior studies reported reaction time facilitation for shared
distinctive items relative to other category combination
(Johnson & Mullen, 1994; McConnell et al., 1994). These
reaction time findings provided support for the SDA, assum-
ing that shared distinctiveness leads to high accessibility of
these items in memory. Yet in our study, reaction times at test
showed an opposite pattern and were faster to negative major-
ity and positive minority items than to positive majority and
negative minority items. These results seem to reflect a speed-
accuracy trade-off and provide no evidence for facilitated ac-
cessibility of shared distinctive items. Thus, our reaction time
findings do not support the SDA either.
Consistent with previous IC research (see Mullen &
Johnson, 1990, for a review), negative minority items were
estimated to be more frequent than negative majority items
indicating the presence of an IC. Based on the SDA, we ex-
pected that memory performance would predict the IC.
However, neither the unbiased hit rates nor the source confi-
dence judgments predicted the extent of IC in the multiple
regression analysis. This was unexpected, as prior studies in-
vestigating the relationship between memory and IC found
significant correlations with memory measures (Fiedler et al.
1993; Hamilton et al., 1985; Weigl, Mecklinger et al., 2016b;
Weigl et al., 2018). One potential explanation might be that
the IC was smaller in the current study compared with the
previous studies. However, the relationship between memory
and IC was not substantiated by other studies either, such as
Van Rooy et al. (2013). In this study, ICs were not contingent
on the presence or absence of negative items in the least fre-
quent group (see also Fiedler, 1991).
To sum up, our results cast doubts on the existence of a
prominent direct relationship between memory for shared dis-
tinctive items and ICs, as proposed by the SDA.
Effects of shared distinctiveness on the P300
We expected to find an enhanced P300 SME for the minority
relative to the majority and the largest P300 SMEs for nega-
tive minority items. The present study revealed a pronounced
generic P300 SME (Figure S1), which was, however, not
modulated by shared distinctiveness. This finding does not
support the notion that shared distinctiveness, as defined in
our study, promotes encoding. This was surprising as prior
research suggested that the P300 SME is enhanced with mi-
nority status (Weigl, Ehritt et al., 2016a) and negative valence
(Kamp et al., 2015). Instead, in our study the SME increased
with emotional intensity (Figure S4), suggesting that in cur-
rent experimental set-up higher emotional intensity (but not
source or valence) modulated encoding processing, as
reflected in the P300 SME.
However, our P300 results indicate that our frequency ma-
nipulation was effective.
Consistent with the literature associating the P300 with the
updating of mental schemata and subjective probability
(Duncan-Johnson & Donchin, 1977; Polich, 2007), we found
a larger P300 for the minority relative to the majority
(Figure S2). No such effect was found for valence
(Figure S3). Moreover, intensity modulated the interaction
between valence and source: Only for highly intense items,
P300 amplitudes were larger for negative minority items than



















P300 for highly intense items
Majority
Minority
Fig. 5 Predicted P300 amplitudes and slopes based on the follow-up
analysis for highly intense items. Please note that the predicted values
were calculated with the model formula (3.15 + 0.05*Valence –
0.89*Source + 2.15 * Valence * Source) and the values for Valence
and Source in section 3.2.1. Please note that the colors used for illustrating
the majority/minority are exemplary: Color attribution for majority and
minority words was balanced
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suggest that minority items become distinct because of their
combination of rareness, negative valence, and intensity, rath-
er than just rareness and negative valence, as we initially pre-
sumed. This finding might be interpreted as tentative evidence
for the SDA.
By contrast, the P300 was smaller for highly intense nega-
tive majority items than for highly intense positive majority
items, which conflicts with the SDA (Fig. 5). The latter result
cannot be attributed to misperceived frequencies for majority
items, because the preponderance of the majority color and of
positive items was correctly identified in the frequency esti-
mation task. Arousal effects on the P300 can be precluded as
well, because even the highly intense stimuli were still
matched for arousal.
All in all, the ERP results did not provide support for the
SDA either. Nevertheless, similar cross-over interaction pat-
terns were found for memory and the P300 for highly intense
stimuli. While the current results are hard to accommodate
within the SDA framework, another account, namely
Attention Theory, might provide a parsimonious explanation
for these findings.
Attention Theory: Shared distinctiveness,
accentuation, and illusory correlations
Attention Theory (AT; Kruschke, 2003), which has been suc-
cessfully applied to frequency-related phenomena like the IC
(Sherman et al., 2009) offers a more integrative perspective on
our results. In situations with skewed frequency distributions
for categories (e.g., majority and minority) and their attributes
(e.g., positive/negative valence), the speed of acquisition is
higher for the frequent attribute relative to the infrequent attri-
bute. The attribute that is learned first not only defines the
category acquired first, but also what other attributes are used
for differentiation and accentuation (i.e., the exaggeration of
both, between-category differences and within-category simi-
larities). In essence, AT claims that the most and the least
frequent category combination in the IC paradigm receive
more attention than the two remaining category combinations.
This ultimately results in an IC as the majority is associated
with positivity and the minority with negativity.
In our study, the positivity of the majority source should
have been learned first resulting in an attention shift to nega-
tive minority items for differentiation. Consistent with this
idea, we found stronger effects for positive majority and neg-
ative minority items than for the other category combinations
in the behavioral measures and the P300. Thus, our results
imply that attention allocated to diametrically opposed cate-
gory combinations lead to the accentuation of category differ-
ences, with the P300 reflecting contrast enhancement for the
most informative category combinations (i.e., majority posi-
tive and minority negative).
AlthoughAT (Sherman et al., 2009) does not make specific
predictions regarding episodicmemory, it seems plausible that
attention shifts contributed to better encoding of the most and
the least frequent category combination. The cross-over pat-
tern found for source memory, i.e., better source memory for
positive majority and negative minority items relative to neg-
ative majority and positive minority items, are in line with this
notion.
At first glance, the absence of a P300 SME modulated by
valence and source and of a correlation between source mem-
ory and IC seem surprising even within the AT framework.
However, neither effect is essential for AT, because attention
shifts alone are enough to result in different impressions for
both groups. Furthermore, AT assumes that these impressions
are formed over the course of category acquisition and are not
reliant on detailed episodic memory. Thus, AT can account
for the main findings in our study, namely the cross-over
pattern observed in memory and the P300 for highly intense
items, and is not necessarily contradicted by the absence of a
modulation of the P300 SME by shared distinctiveness.
To sum up, accentuation was a post-hoc explanation for the
unexpected interaction pattern in the behavioral and ERP data
in our study. Therefore, the accentuation interpretation has to
be considered preliminary. So far, accentuation was rarely
investigated in IC studies (Berndsen et al., 2001; McGarty
et al., 1993) and fails to account for the presence of an IC
under equated frequencies for valence (Weigl et al., 2018).
Moreover, Kutzner and Fiedler (2015) fitted computational
models on data from four IC experiments and showed that
models without an attention shift mechanism fit the data
equally well as models with such a mechanism. This indicates
a clear need for more systematic investigations of accentua-
tion and attention shifts as driving factor behind ICs.
Psychophysiological methods with high temporal resolution
like ERPs or eye-tracking are particularly well-suited for in-
vestigating attention shifts in the IC paradigm (Weigl, 2019).
Caveats
Our study has several major caveats. First, there were 160
items in the most frequent category combination (i.e., positive
majority items), but 200 items in the remaining three category
combinations (Table 1). Thus, there were fewer items in the
most frequent category combination than distinctive items.
This also might have contributed to the unusual interaction
pattern found in the P300. Most P300 SME studies only pres-
ent a single distinctive item per list (Fabiani & Donchin, 1995;
Weigl, Ehritt, et al., 2016a). A control experiment with fewer
items per list in the least frequent categorymight provide more
conclusive test of the SDA.
Second, several types of distinctiveness are inherent in the
structure of the IC paradigm (Weigl et al., 2018). Primary dis-
tinctiveness was induced by the infrequency of the minority
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source and negative items. However, negative items are also
distinctive due to secondary distinctiveness (Schmidt, 2012).
Using only physical distinctiveness (i.e., size and color) might
be more suitable to test the influence of shared distinctiveness
on ERPs and memory than the present paradigm.
Third, given the limited range of highly positive or nega-
tive German words provided by Lahl et al. (2009), we had to
include less intense words in order to achieve a high trial
number and, consequently, a high signal-to-noise ratio.
Despite rigorously matching the words for factors known to
affect memory (Table S1), positive and negative items still
differed in intensity. Our P300 results, however, suggest that
future studies need to consider intensity in order to obtain
unambiguous results. Replications of our study could use lan-
guages, such as English or Spanish, which allow controlling
for intensity with existing extensive word norms.
Fourth, source memory tasks are common in IC research,
but might not be optimally suited for investigating the rela-
tionship between ICs and memory. Source memory tasks pro-
vide cues (i.e., the complete item without source information),
which are not present during frequency estimation. Thus, par-
ticipants might recognize items during test which they cannot
retrieve during frequency estimation. Moreover, participants
assign items to the majority or the minority in the source
memory task, whereas they gauge the number of negative
items for the majority and minority during frequency estima-
tion (i.e., the reverse question). This situation might be aggra-
vated in the present study by the sheer amount of items, be-
cause participants might have relied on small samples of the
retrieved items during frequency estimation. Because free re-
call provides direct insight into what participants spontaneous-
ly retrieve from memory, it might provide a feasible alterna-
tive to the source memory task for investigating the relation
between memory and IC. Moreover, there is a clear need for
more research investigating how the relationship between
memory performance and ICs change as the number of stud-
ied items increases.
Conclusions
Our study makes three major contributions to the literature.
First of all, our study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first
to investigate the distinctiveness-based IC in an ERP para-
digm using all essential features of the illusory correlation
paradigm by Hamilton and Gifford (1976). We found an IC
even after extended learning and thereby replicated prior
research.
Second, our behavioral and ERP results are incompatible
with the SDA, indicating that this account might not be suit-
able for explaining the formation of ICs. Rather, we propose
AT, which encompasses both accentuation and distinctiveness
in a unifying theory (Sherman et al., 2009), as one intriguing
post-hoc explanation for the (from the perspective of the
SDA) unexpected cross-over interaction pattern in the ERP
and memory data. However, we could not link attention shifts
to memory formation processes indexed by the P300 SME.
Clearly, more research, especially with psychophysiological
methods like ERPs or eye-tracking, is needed to establish how
exactly attention allocation contributes to ICs. AT (Sherman
et al., 2009) may provide an integrative perspective to guide
future studies.
Third, the current study shows that emotional intensity is
relevant for ICs. For the P300, a cross-over interaction was
observed only for high intensity items. Thus, the P300 find-
ings suggest that minority items become distinct because of
their combination of rareness, negative valence, and intensity,
rather than just rareness and negative valence. At the same
time, our study shows that the IC can be observed even after
controlling for arousal, concreteness, word length, and word
frequency, indicating that these factors are not pivotal for il-
lusory correlations to arise.
Our study blended the neuroscience of learning andmemory
with the literature on social cognition and provided new in-
sights in the neural underpinnings of stereotype acquisition.
However, more research is needed in order to obtain a more
integrative view of social cognition and cognitive neuroscience.
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